Friday, May 22, 2020

WPSeku V0.4 - Wordpress Security Scanner



WPSeku is a black box WordPress vulnerability scanner that can be used to scan remote WordPress installations to find security issues.

Installation
$ git clone https://github.com/m4ll0k/WPSeku.git wpseku
$ cd wpseku
$ pip3 install -r requirements.txt
$ python3 wpseku.py

Usage

Generic Scan
python3 wpseku.py --url https://www.xxxxxxx.com --verbose

  • Output
----------------------------------------
_ _ _ ___ ___ ___| |_ _ _
| | | | . |_ -| -_| '_| | |
|_____| _|___|___|_,_|___|
|_| v0.4.0

WPSeku - Wordpress Security Scanner
by Momo Outaadi (m4ll0k)
----------------------------------------

[ + ] Target: https://www.xxxxxxx.com
[ + ] Starting: 02:38:51

[ + ] Server: Apache
[ + ] Uncommon header "X-Pingback" found, with contents: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/xmlrpc.php
[ i ] Checking Full Path Disclosure...
[ + ] Full Path Disclosure: /home/ehc/public_html/wp-includes/rss-functions.php
[ i ] Checking wp-config backup file...
[ + ] wp-config.php available at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/wp-config.php
[ i ] Checking common files...
[ + ] robots.txt file was found at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/robots.txt
[ + ] xmlrpc.php file was found at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/xmlrpc.php
[ + ] readme.html file was found at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/readme.html
[ i ] Checking directory listing...
[ + ] Dir "/wp-admin/css" listing enable at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/wp-admin/css/
[ + ] Dir "/wp-admin/images" listing enable at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/wp-admin/images/
[ + ] Dir "/wp-admin/includes" listing enable at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/wp-admin/includes/
[ + ] Dir "/wp-admin/js" listing enable at: https://www.xxxxxxx.com/wp-admin/js/
......

Bruteforce Login
python3 wpseku.py --url https://www.xxxxxxx.com --brute --user test --wordlist wl.txt --verbose

  • Output
----------------------------------------
_ _ _ ___ ___ ___| |_ _ _
| | | | . |_ -| -_| '_| | |
|_____| _|___|___|_,_|___|
|_| v0.4.0

WPSeku - Wordpress Security Scanner
by Momo Outaadi (m4ll0k)
----------------------------------------

[ + ] Target: https://www.xxxxxxx.com
[ + ] Starting: 02:46:32

[ + ] Bruteforcing Login via XML-RPC...
[ i ] Setting user: test
[ + ] Valid Credentials:

-----------------------------
| Username | Passowrd |
-----------------------------
| test | kamperasqen13 |
-----------------------------

Scan plugin,theme and wordpress code
python3 wpseku.py --scan <dir/file> --verbose

Note: Testing Akismet Directory Plugin https://plugins.svn.wordpress.org/akismet
  • Output
----------------------------------------
_ _ _ ___ ___ ___| |_ _ _
| | | | . |_ -| -_| '_| | |
|_____| _|___|___|_,_|___|
|_| v0.4.0

WPSeku - Wordpress Security Scanner
by Momo Outaadi (m4ll0k)
----------------------------------------

[ + ] Checking PHP code...
[ + ] Scanning directory...
[ i ] Scanning trunk/class.akismet.php file
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Line | Possibile Vuln. | String |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 597 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['action']", b"$_GET['action']"] |
| 601 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['for']", b"$_GET['for']"] |
| 140 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['akismet_comment_nonce']", b"$_POST['akismet_comment_nonce']"] |
| 144 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['_ajax_nonce-replyto-comment']"] |
| 586 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['status']", b"$_POST['status']"] |
| 588 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['spam']", b"$_POST['spam']"] |
| 590 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['unspam']", b"$_POST['unspam']"] |
| 592 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['comment_status']", b"$_POST['comment_status']"] |
| 599 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['action']", b"$_POST['action']"] |
| 214 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']", b"$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']"] |
| 403 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['REQUEST_TIME_FLOAT']", b"$_SERVER['REQUEST_TIME_FLOAT']"] |
| 861 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']", b"$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']"] |
| 930 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']", b"$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']"] |
| 934 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']", b"$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']"] |
| 1349 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']"] |
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ i ] Scanning trunk/wrapper.php file
[ + ] Not found vulnerabilities
[ i ] Scanning trunk/akismet.php file
-----------------------------------------------
| Line | Possibile Vuln. | String |
-----------------------------------------------
| 55 | Authorization Hole | [b'is_admin()'] |
-----------------------------------------------
[ i ] Scanning trunk/class.akismet-cli.php file
[ + ] Not found vulnerabilities
[ i ] Scanning trunk/class.akismet-widget.php file
[ + ] Not found vulnerabilities
[ i ] Scanning trunk/index.php file
[ + ] Not found vulnerabilities
[ i ] Scanning trunk/class.akismet-admin.php file
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Line | Possibile Vuln. | String |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| 39 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['page']", b"$_GET['page']"] |
| 134 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['akismet_recheck']", b"$_GET['akismet_recheck']"] |
| 152 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['view']", b"$_GET['view']"] |
| 190 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['view']", b"$_GET['view']"] |
| 388 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['recheckqueue']"] |
| 841 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['view']", b"$_GET['view']"] |
| 843 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['view']", b"$_GET['view']"] |
| 850 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['action']"] |
| 851 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['action']"] |
| 852 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['_wpnonce']", b"$_GET['_wpnonce']"] |
| 868 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['token']", b"$_GET['token']"] |
| 869 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['token']"] |
| 873 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['action']"] |
| 874 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['action']"] |
| 1005 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['akismet_recheck_complete']"] |
| 1006 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['recheck_count']"] |
| 1007 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_GET['spam_count']"] |
| 31 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['action']", b"$_POST['action']"] |
| 256 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['_wpnonce']"] |
| 260 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b'$_POST[$option]', b'$_POST[$option]'] |
| 267 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['key']"] |
| 392 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['offset']", b"$_POST['offset']", b"$_POST['limit']", b"$_POST['limit']"] |
| 447 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['id']"] |
| 448 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['id']"] |
| 460 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['id']", b"$_POST['url']"] |
| 461 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['id']"] |
| 464 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_POST['url']"] |
| 388 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_REQUEST['action']", b"$_REQUEST['action']"] |
| 400 | Cross-Site Scripting | [b"$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']", b"$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']"] |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[ i ] Scanning trunk/class.akismet-rest-api.php file
[ + ] Not found vulnerabilities

Credits and Contributors
Original idea and script from WPScan Team (https://wpscan.org/)
WPScan Vulnerability Database (https://wpvulndb.com/api)




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Thursday, May 21, 2020

Insecurities Of WhatsApp's, Signal's, And Threema's Group Chats

Recently, the theoretical and practical analysis of secure instant messenger protocols received much attention, but the focus of prior evaluations mostly lay in one-to-one communication. In this blog post we want to presents the results of our work that focuses on group chat protocols of three major instant messenger applications; namely Signal, WhatsApp, and Threema.

In this blog post, we aim to focus on the practical impact and the found weaknesses identified by our analysis. The interested reader may also look into our paper for more details.


Our Aim and What We Were Looking For

End-to-end encryption protects the confidentiality of communication that is forwarded via central servers to the designated receivers. As a consequence, neither parties on the network route of the messages, nor the provider of the central server (e.g. the WhatsApp server) should be able to read any information out of the observation of the communication. In particular, no other user of the application should have access to the communication. Further it might be desirable to require that also the messages' integrity is end-to-end protected and that a sender is informed about the delivery state of sent messages.
Delivery state information in Signal (upper screenshot) and WhatsApp (lower screenshot)

In a two party scenario, this analysis is rather fixed to two components of the protocol: the key establishment between both parties and the communication channel protection using the established key (mostly consisting of an encryption algorithm and a scheme for providing integrity like MACs or signature schemes).

Regarded attackers


In a group setting, the same attackers apply (network, provider, other users). However the requirements for secure communication differ. It is further necessary that only group members can write to and read content from the group. Additionally, only administrators of the group are able to add new members.

In addition to these standard requirements, we also evaluated the protocols' security guarantees if the client's secrets were revealed (forward secrecy and future secrecy).

Our Approach

We analyzed the mentioned protocols by reading the source code and debugging the apps. We also used alternative open source implementations of Threema and WhatsApp as a help and we traced the network traffic. When using alternative implementations, we only took incoming traffic into account, which was generated by official applications. Thereby we extracted the protocol descriptions and evaluated them regarding the defined requirements.

Our Findings

In WhatsApp and Threema, the provider was able to manipulate the set of members. Threema only allowed the provider to rewind the set of members to a previous state. As a consequence previously removed members could have been added to the group again. The WhatsApp provider is able to arbitrarily manipulate the member set. Thereby further members and administrators can be added to the group. Since the authenticity of group manipulation is not protected, the WhatsApp provider can set the real group administrator as the source of manipulation even though this administrator was not active.

Since Signal's key exchange protocol provides future secrecy, we also evaluated the protocol's ability to recover into a secure group state after a member's state was compromised. The essential weakness here is that a sender only needs to know the static group ID to send a message to the group. If a group member receives a message with the correct group ID, no verification regarding the current member set takes place but the message is directly added to the group communication. Consequently it is sufficient to retrieve the group ID in order to send messages to the group. Since Signal treats content messages the same way as messages for the manipulation of the group set, an attacker who knows the group ID can add herself to the group and thereby read the subsequent group communication.

In addition to this, in all cases the delivery state of sent messages was not securely provided. Threema's group chats do not inform the sender about the delivery state while Signal and WhatsApp do not protect the delivery information on the end-to-end layer. Therefore the central provider can forge this information and drop messages without letting the communicating parties detect this.

Also the order of messages was manipulable for the providers of the applications such that the provider is able to deliver the messages in a different order than they were sent. Threema's weakness of rewinding a group state results from missing replay attack protection.

Impact of Weaknesses

Even though end-to-end encryption is implemented in all analyzed applications, the central providers can largely manipulate the communication in groups and partially also read it.
In all applications, the provider can undetectably drop and reorder messages during the delivery and thereby manipulate the view of the communication such that further attacks can be obfuscated.
The central servers of WhatsApp can be used to add arbitrary users to groups and thereby receive their communication.
To achieve the same result for Signal, it suffices to retrieve the group ID. An earlier member who left the group once still knows this ID since it is static. However, in contrast to WhatsApp, the origin of the manipulation is correctly displayed in the Signal application (which was not the fact when we started our analysis).

As a result, the end-to-end protection of WhatsApp is not sufficient to reach confidentiality in groups. For Signal no future secrecy is reached in groups and Threema was vulnerable to replay attacks which resulted in further weaknesses.

Responsible Disclosure

We disclosed our findings to the developers and received varying response. Threema updated their protocol in version 3.14 such that our attacks are not feasible anymore. Moxie Marlinspike responded that Signal is "working on an entirely new group mechanism that we should be deploying soon". WhatsApp did not hold out the prospect of fixing the described vulnerabilities (Update 01/18: According to Facebook's Security Head, the invite links make a fix more difficult [1]; we proposed a way to solve this issue [2]).

[1] https://twitter.com/alexstamos/status/951169036947107840
[2] https://web-in-security.blogspot.de/2018/01/group-instant-messaging-why-baming.html
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Cain And Abel

"Cain & Abel is a password recovery tool for Microsoft Operating Systems. It allows easy recovery of various kind of passwords by sniffing the network, cracking encrypted passwords using Dictionary, Brute-Force and Cryptanalysis attacks, recording VoIP conversations, decoding scrambled passwords, recovering wireless network keys, revealing password boxes, uncovering cached passwords and analyzing routing protocols. The program does not exploit any software vulnerabilities or bugs that could not be fixed with little effort. It covers some security aspects/weakness present in protocol's standards, authentication methods and caching mechanisms; its main purpose is the simplified recovery of passwords and credentials from various sources, however it also ships some "non standard" utilities for Microsoft Windows users." read more...

Website: http://www.oxid.it/cain.html

Continue reading

Wednesday, May 20, 2020

October 2019 Connector

OWASP
Connector
October 2019

COMMUNICATIONS


Letter from the Vice Chairman of the Board

Dear OWASP Community,  

Two of the primary initiatives the foundation staff has been working on over the past few months were the two back to back Global AppSec Events in DC and Amsterdam.  This was a huge undertaking by everyone involved.  We are pleased to announce that the survey feed back is positive and both events were well attended.  I was in attendance of Global AppSec Amsterdam and it was great meeting and speaking with old friends and meeting new ones.  I would also like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the board to thank OWASP staff for their efforts in making the two conferences so successful. 

To continuing on with the events theme; I'm really happy to announce the locations of our 2020 OWASP Global AppSec Conferences.  The first one will be June 15 - 19, 2020 in Dublin and the second will be October 19 - 23, 2020 in San Francisco.  Dublin is not an exotic trip for me, more of a 10 minute tram ride.  Hopefully you will join us, while also making the most of the culture and scenery that Ireland has to offer.   

Last but not least, the OWASP Global Board of Directors election results where released Thursday October 17, 2019. I'd like to first thank everyone who has put their trust in me by voting me back onto the board for the next two years. I hope I do you justice.

I would also like to thank the large number of candidates that were willing to give of their personal time and run to be part of the Global OWASP Board.  This is a testament of the dedication and commitment of our members to continue to grow and evolve to the next level as an organization.  I encourage those that were not elected will still be involved in making a positive change by volunteering to be part of a committee.  The board and staff need all the help they can get to push through change. I hope you will join us in this journey.  We can not be successful without the help of the community. 

Until next time, 
Owen Pendlebury 
Vice Chairman, OWASP Global Board of Directors 
OWASP Global Board Election Results 
 
The newly elected 2020 OWASP Board Members:
Grant Ongers
Owen Pendlebury
Sherif Mansour
Vandana Verma Sengal
 
Congratulations, and thank you to all the candidates that participated and the OWASP members that voted. 
OWASP Foundation Global AppSec Event Dates for 2020

Global AppSec Dublin, June 15 - 19, 2020

Global AppSec San Francisco, October 19 - 23, 2020



Visit our website for future announcements.

EVENTS 

You may also be interested in one of our other affiliated events:


REGIONAL EVENTS
Event DateLocation
BASC 2019 (Boston Application Security Conference) October 19,2019 Burlington, MA
LASCON X October 24 - 25, 2019 Austin, TX
OWASP AppSec Day 2019 Oct 30 - Nov 1, 2019 Melbourne, Australia
German OWASP Day 2019 December 9 - 10, 2019 Karlsruhe, Germany
AppSec California 2020 January 21 - 24, 2020 Santa Monica, CA
OWASP New Zealand Day 2020 February 20 - 21, 2020 Auckland, New Zealand
Seasides 2020 March 3 - 5, 2020 Panjim Goa, India
SnowFROC 2020 March 5, 2020 Denver, CO

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP EVENTS
Event Date Location
BlackHat Europe 2019 December 2 - 5, 2019 London


BlackHat Europe 2019 London at EXCEL London
2019 December 2-5 
Visit the OWASP Booth 1015
Business Hall December 4 & 5 
December 4, 10:30 AM - 7:00 PM
December 5: 10:00 AM - 4:00 PM

OWASP Members are eligible for € 200.00 discount , email marketing@owasp.org for code to use when registering.

PROJECTS

Projects were well-represented at the previous two Global AppSec conferences in DC and Amsterdam this past month.  Both events featured the popular Project Showcase and I heartily thank the leaders of the projects who participated:

Secure Medical Device Deployment Standard
Secure Coding Dojo
API Security Project
Dependency Check
SAMM
SEDATED
DefectDojo
Juice Shop
ModSecuity Core Rule Set
SecurityRAT
WebGoat

These leaders put on a great set of presentations and, in many cases, the room was standing room only.  Thank you!

The project reviews that were done in DC and Amsterdam are still being evaluated and worked on; if you are waiting on answers, please have patience.  I hope to have them finalized by November.

The website migration continues moving forward.  The process of adding users to the proper repositories is an on-going effort.  If you have not given your GitHub username, please drop by the Request for Leader Github Usernames form.  A nice-to-accomplish goal would be to have the projects and chapters in their new website homes within the next 30 days.

Harold L. Blankenship
Director of Technology and Projects

COMMUNITY

Welcome to the New OWASP Chapters 
Sacramento, California
Marquette, Michigan
Ranchi, India
Paraiba, Brazil
Calgary, Canada 

CORPORATE MEMBERS 

 
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